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Abstract
HOMEOSTASIS-DRIVEN RESPONSES TO CONSUMER SENSATIONS
by
Rhonda Hadi

Advisor: Lauren Block, PhD
This research examines the effect of experienced physical temperature on an individual’s
decision-making process. Reliance on emotions can function as a warming process and reliance
on cognitions can function as a cooling process, hence individuals are nonconsciously induced to
alter their decision-making style according to their thermoregulatory objectives. My first two
studies support a thermoregulatory account by demonstrating that the mere use of cognitive
versus affective processing leads to both self-reported and objective changes in body
temperature, and that the adoption of a compensatory pathway can indeed aid in providing
temperature-related comfort. My last three studies demonstrate that individuals adopt these
compensatory pathways on their own accord, and accordingly we document the effects of both
physical and simulated temperature on choice, willingness to pay, and donation likelihood, and
support the role of reliance on emotions as a mediator.
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Introduction
Consumers are constantly exposed to fluctuations in physical temperature. Some of these
fluctuations happen gradually (e.g. changing seasons), while other changes happen much more
suddenly (stepping inside an air-conditioned store, or taking a sip of a hot drink at a cafe). In
response to such variations, our bodies physiologically respond to ensure that we maintain a
specific internal body temperature--a process known as thermoregulation (Alberts and Brunjes
1978; Kirkes 1899). In this research, we suggest that autonomic physiological responses may not
be the only way in which humans thermoregulate. We propose that humans can engage in
thermoregulation via non-physiological means, a process we term “mental thermoregulation.”
Specifically, we suggest that reliance on affect can function as a warming agent, reliance on
cognitions can function as a cooling agent, and thus the adoption of a particular decision-making
process can operate as a thermoregulatory mechanism.
How might mental processes serve as a direct vehicle for thermoregulation, an ostensibly
physiological phenomenon? In the behavioral sciences, the term “cool” processing typically
refers to those processes which involve calculative cognitions, linear if-then logical progression,
and critical analysis, while “warm” processing alludes to associative systems involving feelings,
desires, and emotions (Metcalfe and Mischel 1999). This terminology suggests that at least
semantically, each of these processes encompasses a distinct thermoregulatory tone. A number of
research programs, including Barsalou’s (1999) framework on perceptual symbol systems, posit
that semantic expressions are underpinned by sensory perception, hence semantic expressions
that suggest sensory dimensions may in fact have physiological bases. If semantic expressions
are usually underpinned by sensory bases, then it may be fruitful to investigate whether those
sensory pathways exist, and why. In this research, we suggest that reliance on emotions can
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function as a warming process whereas reliance on cognitions functions as a cooling process, and
therefore individuals may alter their decision-making style to move toward their
thermoregulatory objectives.
Specifically, we propose that experienced temperatures beyond an organism’s
homeostatic levels may lead them to compensate by adopting a decision making style with an
opposite thermoregulatory tone. In other words, when exposed to cooler than homeostatic
temperature conditions, we expect individuals to respond with a “warm” decision-making
process (taking an affective pathway) in an effort to warm up, whereas in warmer than
homeostatic conditions, we expect individuals to apply a “cool” decision making process (taking
a cognitive pathway) in an effort to cool down.
This research makes several meaningful theoretical contributions. We suggest that an
individual may choose to embody a decision-making process that is semantically consistent with
his or her thermoregulatory objectives (and thus inconsistent with his or her thermoregulatory
state). As far as the authors are aware, no research has examined whether an individual’s
decision-making process can function to change perceived or actual temperature, nor whether an
attempt to do so may be part of an individual’s nonconsciously activated regulatory strategy.
Thus, unlike much of the literature based on embodied cognition, this research provides
an example and explanation of why individuals may respond to physical sensations in an
oppositional, compensatory fashion (not in a manner congruent with the experienced sensation).
Instead of merely reacting to the physical temperature in a metaphorically assimilative manner
(i.e. relying on emotions more when warm), physical sensations might instead activate a
thermoregulatory goal, thus motivating individuals to employ a process with a contrasting
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thermoregulatory tone. To support these predictions, we will briefly review the relevant
literatures.

3

Conceptual Framework
Human Responses to Temperature
Responses to temperatures within the comfort zone. Previous research has documented
that consumers’ physical surroundings significantly impact their judgments and decisions (Belk
1975). However, temperature has remained a relatively understudied atmospheric variable,
despite the fact that it is ever-present, and consumers seem to be quite conscious of it (Cheema
and Patrick 2012). Recently, researchers have documented some important consequences of
modest ambient temperatures on consumer behavior. One noteworthy example is work by
Cheema and Patrick (2012), which examines the effect of a subtle range of temperatures (67 77°F) on task performance. Building on a thermal stress paradigm, they find that relatively warm
temperatures (around 77°F) increase thermal load, leading to increased reliance on System 1
(heuristic) processing, and thus hampering performance on complex tasks. Along the same vein,
Tong and colleagues (2013) find that within a comfortable range of temperatures (61 – 79°F),
cool temperatures encourage primarily systematic processing and thus enhance performance on
simple tasks, while warm temperatures prompt primarily heuristic processing, and thus lead to
better performance on complex tasks.
Importantly, the work above examined temperatures within a modest range (61 – 79°F).
According to Hancock and Warm’s Maximal Adaptability Model (MAM; 1989), all these
temperatures fall within the so-called “comfort zone” (i.e. 60.8–84.2°F), but only the cold
temperature conditions fell within the more narrowly-defined “normative zone” (i.e. 62.6–
73.4°F). According to MAM, temperatures within the comfort zone but outside the normative
zone will leave people with limited cognitive resources to focus on tasks. Thus in the work by
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Cheema and Patrick (2012) and Tong and colleagues (2013), participants only experienced
thermal-stress in the warm conditions, but all participants were “comfortable” temperature-wise.
But what happens when temperatures move outside the limited “comfort zone” range? In
the present research, we examine consumer responses to temperature that are outside this
“comfort” zone. In other words, we explore how consumers behave in temperatures that may feel
“too cold” (hypostress) or “too warm” (hyperstress, Hancock and Warm 1989). This distinction
is crucial, because we would expect such temperatures to elicit goal-directed responses, while we
would not expect such motivated behavior if consumers feel thermally comfortable. To explore
how such excessively high or low temperatures impact consumers’ behavior, we next turn to
literature on thermoregulation.
Physical Thermoregulation. Individuals often face fluctuations in their external
environment (e.g. changing weather). In response to such variations, our bodies have a tendency
to physiologically regulate our internal environment to ensure stability---a dynamic, iterative
process known as homeostasis (Jänig 2008; Marieb and Hoehn 2007). One homeostatic process
that is vital to our survival is thermoregulation: our body must maintain a specific internal body
temperature, thus we regulate our internal environment to achieve and maintain a stable and
balanced condition via autonomic responses (Alberts and Brunjes 1978; Kirkes 1899).
Accordingly, many physiological responses to heat and cold (e.g. sweating, shivering) are tied to
our need to keep our core body temperature stable (Bell and Greene 1982). Many organs
function to promote thermoregulation, including our brains. One method our brains use to help
encourage behavioral thermoregulation is via state-dependent alterations of hedonic perception:
our brains generate pleasure or aversion towards stimuli depending on our internal state and
corresponding homeostatic needs (Cabanac 1971; Rolls 2005). Specifically, the brain generates
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pleasure toward warm stimuli when our core temperature is colder than basal requirements, and
pleasure toward cool stimuli when we are warmer than homeostatic temperature requirements
(Panksepp 1998). This suggests that experienced temperatures can create different
thermoregulatory objectives, and one route to fulfill those objectives is via attraction to
physically warm or cold stimuli (King and Janiszewski 2011).
Compensatory Behaviors in Response to Temperature. However, purely physiological
thermoregulation may not be the only way in which humans respond to overly hot or cold
temperatures. A growing body of literature seems to suggest that people may compensate for
suboptimal temperature conditions via alternative behavioral responses. For example, Parker and
Tavassoli (2000) accumulated correlational data suggesting that the per capita consumption of
stimulating products like alcohol, cocoa, coffee, tea and tobacco is higher in high latitudes, even
when controlling for income. In a follow-up paper, it is argued that people in colder climates are
below their optimal stimulation level, and thus may be more likely to seek sensation and arousal
(Tavassoli 2009). This is supported by research that suggests that cold (vs. warm) weather leads
to increases in aggressiveness and risk-taking, resulting in higher stock market returns (Cao and
Wei 2005). Further, other research streams seem to suggest that people may try to counteract for
excess cold through other compensatory behaviors. For example, findings suggest that
individuals are more motivated to watch romantic movies and engage in interpersonal activities
when they feel physically cold, to reduce the feeling of coldness (Hong and Sun 2011; Zhang
and Risen 2010). More recent research has also suggested that consumers associate abundance
with physical warmth, and thus physical cold drives increased purchase intention and purchase
quantities (Wang and Zhou 2012). Thus the existing literature has suggested that consuming
stimulating products, partaking in interpersonal activities, and increasing purchase quantity all
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seem to function as “warming” agents.
Collectively then, extant research indicates that individuals often respond to physical
temperatures in a manner that seems to be compensatory in nature. We suggest that this is indeed
the case, and further propose that humans may compensate for high or low physical temperatures
via largely mental means, a process we term “mental thermoregulation.” Specifically, we
propose that the use of a particular decision-making style (using either an affective or cognitive
pathway) can serve as a thermoregulatory mechanism by making individuals feel either hot or
cold, respectively. But why might one’s reliance on emotions vs. cognitions affect how thy feel
thermally? To explore this question, we turn to support from literature on perceived temperature.

Antecedents of Perceived Temperature
Ample research has demonstrated that experienced thoughts and feelings are not
independent of physical and somatic perception (Barsalou 2008; Varela, Thompson, and Rosch
1991), and accordingly, cognitions and feelings can illicit perceptual stimulation and somatic
responses (Barsalou 1999; Schubert 2005). Accordingly, the notion that psychological behaviors
can lead to physiological temperatures responses is not startling. In fact, research in social
perception suggests that affective feelings can have distinct thermoregulatory tones (Ax 1953).
Recent research in neuroscience has suggested that the same part of the brain (the insular cortex)
is involved in processing both psychological and physical warmth information (Kang et al.
2010).
Several researchers have documented the ability of non-physiological factors to impact
an individual’s perceived thermal state. Color cues (Szocs and Biswas 2013), anger-related
thoughts (Wilkowski et al. 2009), communion traits (Szymkow et al. 2013), and feelings of
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loneliness (Zhong and Leonardelli 2008) have all been shown to impact temperature perceptions.
In the last body of work, for example, participants felt colder and evaluated warm food more
highly when a social exclusion experience was either primed (asking participants to recall a past
experience) or induced (via a virtual interaction) (Zhong and Leonardelli 2008). Together, these
studies demonstrate that psychological concepts can in fact impact how warm or cold an
individual feels.
However, such research represents particular concepts deliberately primed or induced by
the experimenter. But might an individual, on his or her own accord, choose to adopt a particular
decision-making process?

Present Research: Mental Thermoregulation
In this research, we suggest that an individual may choose to adopt a decision-making
process that is metaphorically consistent with his or her thermoregulatory objective (and thus
inconsistent with his or her thermoregulatory state). As far as the authors are aware, no research
has examined whether an individual’s decision-making process can function to change perceived
or actual temperature, nor whether an attempt to do so may be part of an individual’s regulatory
strategy.
Importantly, we argue that these effects will manifest when experienced temperatures
shift above or below homeostatic levels. Such temperature changes activate thermoregulatory
objectives, which are what ultimately lead to differences in decision-making style. This
distinguishes the current research from previous work that examines the important effects of
temperature at modest, comfortable ranges (Cheema and Patrick 2012, Tong et al. 2013).
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My motivational regulatory account, which focuses on the processing pathways activated
by experienced temperatures, is distinct from the extant research on metaphor-consistent
behavior in response to physical sensations (Ackerman, Nocera, and Bargh 2010; Williams and
Bargh 2008). In the latter research, metaphor-consistent behavior arises because of established
associative links between two concepts in memory (Ackerman, Nocera, and Bargh 2010;
Williams and Bargh 2008). For example, warm cups make us think the person who gave it to us
has a “warmer” personality (Williams and Bargh 2008). This “haptic mindset” triggers a transfer
of the activated metaphor (e.g., warm) from the original touched object to the target object
(Ackerman, Nocera and Bargh 2010). Importantly, the transfer is limited to the specific concept
and not generalized beyond that; for example, touching hard (vs. soft) objects led participants to
rate a target person as more rigid and strict, but not more or less positive overall (Ackerman,
Nocera and Bargh 2010). Such literature seems to demonstrate metaphor-consistent behavior in
response to physical sensations, while the current research documents an opposite pattern of
causal direction. This shift in directionality stems from two important distinctions. First, as noted
above, my mental thermoregulation framework represents a goal-driven explanation for
behavioral responses to physical sensations. If physical sensations are within comfortable,
homeostatic levels, there is no reason to expect a motivated response. The second distinction
involves the dependent variables being examined. For example, previous research has shown that
experienced temperatures can lead to metaphorically-consistent incidental judgments (e.g. warm
cups make us think the person who gave it to us has a “warmer” personality; Williams and Bargh
2008). However, my account suggests that temperature can also change the way we make
decisions, given that the adopted process allows us to thermally compensate. While there is no
reason to believe the specific content of our judgments will impact our resulting temperature
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(e.g. judging a person to have a warmer personality should not necessarily make us feel warmer,
and we can come up with such judgments via cognitive or affective means), we suggest and
demonstrate that the decision-making style an individual adopts (i.e. cognitive vs. affective
pathway) will indeed have an impact. Thus, by exploring responses to physical sensations via a
regulatory framework, this work addresses the call to more critically examine processes by
which physical sensations exert their effects (Krishna 2012; Zhang and Li 2012).
Thus, we contribute to literature on thermoregulation, atmospherics, and the role of affect
in decision-making by suggesting that reliance on emotions (cognitions) can function as a
warming (cooling) process, and individuals may accordingly alter their decision-making style to
fulfill thermoregulatory objectives in response to experienced physical temperatures that are
cooler or warmer than homeostatic levels in their internal milieu. Assuming that individuals start
off at a relatively homeostatic base level temperature, exposure to excess physical warmth
(coolness) will activate a desire to cool down (warm up), and thus the individual will attempt to
fulfill this objective by adopting a cognitive (affective) decision making style. My proposed
framework, along with a pictorial representation of the mental thermoregulation process, is
depicted in Appendix A.
Mental thermoregulation represents a unique framework for the study of behavioral
response to physical sensation- therefore, I conducted a series of studies that collectively provide
compelling empirical support for my theorizing, but individually provide support for each
element of my theorizing replicated across different domains and dependent variables. My first
two studies support the mental thermoregulation explanation by providing evidence that the mere
use of cognitive versus affective pathways can indeed alter an individual’s perceived and actual
temperature (Study 1), and the adoption of a compensatory pathway can indeed aid in providing
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temperature-related comfort (Study 2). In my last three studies, I test the hypothesis that cold
(warm) temperature leads individuals to spontaneously rely more on affect (cognitions) when
making decisions. Specifically, I examine the effect of temperature willingness to pay (Study 3),
donation likelihood (Study 4), and choice (Study 5), and support the role of reliance on emotions
as a mediator. Thus taken as a set, these five studies provide converging support for my mental
thermoregulation framework (Appendix A).
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Study 1: Temperature Responses
My proposed mental thermoregulation framework hinges on the key prerequisite that
affective and cognitive pathways can function as warming and cooling mechanisms respectively.
However, as far as the author is aware, this has never been empirically tested in the existing
literature. Thus, the purpose of Study 1 was to support the validity of my thermoregulation
account by demonstrating objective, physical temperature fluctuations as a result of affective vs.
cognitive decision-making.
The study was a 2 level (task instructions: affective vs. cognitive) between subjects
design. Upon entering the lab, subjects were equipped with wireless iButtons to measure their
temperature over the duration of the experiment. After a filler task, participants were given
explicit instructions to describe either their feelings (affective condition) or evaluative thoughts
(cognitive condition) in assessing a series of scenarios and I examined the changes in their
physical temperature as a result. I expected that affective processing (as compared to cognitive
processing) would result in objectively warmer (vs. cooler) physical temperature, suggesting that
the ability of affective/cognitive pathways to produce physiological temperature responses.

Method
Upon entering the lab, fifty-eight undergraduate students were asked to indicate which
hand was their non-dominant hand. The experimenter then proceeded to affix an iButton, a
wireless temperature monitor, to the index finger of the participant’s non-dominant hand using
medical tape. I chose to capture temperature at the fingertip because previous research suggests
skin-temperature readings at the fingertip are a convenient and accurate measure for the
assessment of psychophysiological responses and thermoregulatory vasoconstriction (Kistler,
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Mariauzouls, and von Berlepsch 1998; Rubeinstein and Sessler 1990). iButtons contain a
semiconductor temperature sensor and a computer chip with a real time clock and memory
enclosed in a 16 × 6 mm2 stainless steel can. Thus, the iButton functions as both a thermometer
(constantly measuring participants’ temperature) and a data logger (recording the observed
temperature at specified intervals, as frequently as every 8 seconds). This provided the
experimenters with continuous time-stamped temperature data for each participant.
Manufacturing specifications indicate precision of +/-0.125 °C (+/-0.225 °F), and previous
studies have validated the use of iButtons on human skin for clinical and field measurements
(Hasselberg, McMahon, and Parker 2013; Marken Lichtenbelt et al. 2006).
After being outfitted with an iButton, participants started off with a neutral filler task that
lasted approximately ten minutes. The purpose of the filler task was two-fold: first, it served as a
calibration period to allow the iButton time to acclimate to the individual’s skin temperature, and
second, it allowed me to obtain temperature estimates for participants in a neutral state (neither
explicitly cognitive nor affective). After participants completed the filler task, the experimenter
took note of the exact time (in order to match it up with the real-time temperature data later)
before getting the participants started on the second task.
The second task involved the manipulation. Participants were given explicit instructions to
describe either their feelings or evaluative thoughts in assessing a series of scenarios (“Going to
a rock concert” “Taking a test at school,” “Spending Thanksgiving with your family,” and
“Watching your favorite TV show at home.”). In one condition (which I refer to as “affective
instructions”), respondents were instructed to focus and describe their feelings and emotions in
relation to each scenario. In the other condition (which I refer to as “cognitive instructions”),
respondents were told to focus on their objective assessments in describing each scenario (see
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Appendix B, the instructions were adapted from Pham et al. 2001).
After each participant completed this task, the experimenter again noted the exact time.
Participants were then asked to indicate the basis of their assessments in an attempt to ascertain
whether the manipulation did indeed succeed to elicit participants’ use of affective vs. cognitive
pathways. This was measured via a four-item scale scale adapted from Shiv and Fedorikhin 1999
(all seven-point items; “My decision of how much to pay for insurance was driven by: "my
thoughts (1)/my feelings (7)," "my prudent self (1)/my impulsive self (7)," "my rational side
(1)/my emotional side (7)," and "my head (1)/my heart (7)," α = .76). Lastly, participants
indicated their gender and ethnicity. After participants completed the survey, the experimenter
detached the iButton from the participant, and downloaded the logged temperature data.

Results and Discussion
Four students entered the laboratory with food or drink (i.e. coffee and frozen yogurt) that
they consumed throughout the duration the experiment. Because such consumption can clearly
impact body temperature, these individuals were excluded from the remaining analysis. In
addition, three students were interrupted during the duration of the experiment (i.e. for a
bathroom break and to answer a phone call). Because of the time-stamped nature of the
temperature data, these individuals were also excluded, resulting in 51 active observations for
analysis.
Manipulation check. As predicted, results did indeed demonstrate a significant main
effect of processing instructions on respondents’ reliance on affect, (MCognitive = 2.80 vs. MAffective
= 4.34, F(1, 49) = 27.89, p < .01). However, a stem-and-leaf plot indicated that in the cognitive
condition, there were two participants who scored high enough in reliance on affect to be
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considered “extreme” cases. This demonstrates that these participants are outliers, and also
suggests that the two subjects failed to follow the processing instructions (i.e., they used affect
instead of cognition in their processing). Thus, these two participants were removed from further
analysis.
Time Spent on Task. Because task time was not fixed, some participants took longer to
complete the designated task than others. I expected that individuals with the affective
instructions would spend a shorter amount of time on the task than individuals with the cognitive
instructions, since previous literature has repeatedly documented that judgments based on
affective assessments are reached faster than those based on reason-based assessments (Pham
2007; Pham et al. 2001; Verplanken, Hofstee, and Janssen 1998; Zajonc 1980). Results from an
analysis of variance confirmed this expected difference, with a significant main effect of
processing instructions on respondents’ time spent on the task (MCognitive = 18.90 minutes vs.
MAffective = 15.34 minutes, F(1, 49) = 4.04, p < .05).
Hierarchical Linear Model. By matching the time-stamped temperature data with the
recorded task times, the experimenter was able to attain a base temperature estimate for each
participant upon starting the designated affective/cognitive task, along with the participants’
temperature every 8 seconds while performing the given task (see figure 1 for visual
representations of data from two sample participants). As previously mentioned, some
participants took longer to complete the designated task than others, which resulted in a different
number of data points for each participant. I thus applied a longitudinal hierarchical linear model
(HLM) to analyze the data (Khare and Inman 2006; Lam et al. 2013; Raudenbush and Bryk
2002; Snijders 1996). The purpose of this analysis was to assess the impact of the manipulation
(task instructions) on how participants’ temperature changed over time. An important advantage
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of using HLM is that it allows for differences across subjects in the number of measurement
occasions, without needing to discard any data (Snijders 1996). In this model, the Level 1
regression captures within-individual changes in temperature as a function of time. I clocked
time such that the first temperature estimate upon starting the designated task represented the
start of the task (Time 0). Level 2 equations in the model express the Level 1 intercept and slopes
as a function of the between-group predictor (task instructions). Thus, the Level 2 equations
allow us to assess the impact of affective vs. cognitive instructions on an individual’s physical
temperature changes over time. The model specification was as follows:

Level 1:
TEMPti = π0i + π1i*(TIMEti) + eti
Level 2:
π0i = β00 + β01*(TASKi) + r0i
π1i = β10 + β11*(TASKi) + r1i

where TEMP= recorded temperature, TIME=time elapsed, and TASK=task instructions
(cognitive or affective). Analysis results indicate that both the overall intercept and the taskspecific intercept were significant (β00 = 87.21, t = 90.42, p < .001; and, β01 = 2.46, t = 1.71, p =
.09 respectively). The overall slope was not significant (β10 = -0.01, t = -1.64, p > .1), suggesting
that on average, time has no significant effect on temperature. However, and most importantly to
my hypotheses, the coefficient for task-specific slope was indeed significant (β11 = 0.02, t = 2.65,

16

p < .02). This suggests that task instructions did indeed impact the effect of time on temperature.
Importantly, the coefficient is positive, which suggests that affective instructions led to increases
in temperatures compared to cognitive instructions.
Figure 1
Visual Representation of Data from Two Sample Subjects- Study 1
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Simple Slopes Analysis. The HLM results suggest that the task instructions led to
differences in individuals’ temperature over time. However, I also wanted analyze the data
within-conditions, to more closely examine directionality of how cognitive and affective
instructions each impacted individuals’ temperature. To do so, I ran a simple slopes analysis,
using a calculator allowing for differences in the number of measurement occasions across
subjects (Bauer and Curran 2005; Preacher, Curran, and Bauer 2006). Results indicated that for
affective subjects, the slope was positive and significant (β = 0.0093, t = 2.08, p = .04), while for
cognitive subjects, the slope was negative and marginally significant (β = -0.0038, t = -1.71, p =
.09). These results suggest that overall, those individuals who completed the affective
instructions showed increases in temperature on average, while those individuals who completed
the cognitive instructions showed decreases in temperature on average.
Analysis of Variance. Lastly, I conducted a mixed analysis of variance procedure to
assess the impact of the two different processing instructions (cognitive vs. affective) on
participants’ physical temperature across two points in time (before and after the cognitive or
affective task). This additional analysis adds value above the previous analysis because it allows
me to examine the difference in individuals’ temperature across conditions at the end of the task
(because individuals had unique task times, this contrast could not be calculated in the previous
analysis). Results demonstrated a significant interaction between instruction type and time (F(1,
47) = 8.09, p < .01). Before starting the cognitive/affective task, there was no significant
difference between the physical temperature of participants in the two conditions (MCognitive =
86.87 vs. MAffective = 87.93, F(1, 47) < .1). However, after the designated task, results did indeed
demonstrate a significant difference between instruction conditions: as predicted, participants
who completed the task via affective instructions produced a higher temperature than individuals
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who completed the task via cognitive instructions (MCognitive = 85.83 vs. MAffective = 89.29, F(1,
47) = 5.24, p < .05; see figure 2 for a visual representation of contrasts).

Figure 2
Mean Temperture by Condition- Study 1

A second set of planned contrasts examined how individuals’ temperatures changed
within each condition. Results from these contrasts support the pattern of results found in the
simple slopes analysis. In the cognitive instructions condition, individuals’ temperature were
marginally significantly lower after the task, as compared to before the task (MBefore = 86.87 vs.
MAfter = 85.83, F(1, 47) = 3.36, p < .08). Participants in the affective conditions displayed an
opposite pattern: their temperature were significantly higher after the task, as compared to before
the task (MBefore = 87.93 vs. MAfter = 89.29, F(1, 47) = 4.74, p < .05).
Taken together, results from this study support the thermoregulation explanation by
suggesting that the mere use of cognitive versus affective pathways can indeed alter an
individual’s physical temperature via a physiological warming (vs. cooling) process.
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Study 2: Forced Pathways
The purpose of the second study was two-fold: first, to add additional support for the
thermoregulation explanation by suggesting that the mere use of cognitive versus affective
pathways can alter how warm or cold an individual feels (not just objective measures), and more
importantly, to demonstrate that the adoption of a compensatory pathway can aid in providing
temperature-related comfort. In other words, I examined whether individuals feeling too hot or
too cold could at least partially thermoregulate by adopting a compensatory decision-making
process. Further, previous research has suggested that temperature changes may impact arousal
levels (Poulton 1976), although the literature documents that uncomfortable temperatures in
either direction (hot or cold) are both arousing and sedative (Anderson 1989). Nevertheless, I
added a measure to assess and control for any differences in perceived arousal as a result of the
temperature manipulations.
The study took the form of a 2 (temperature: cold vs. warm) x 2 (task instructions:
affective vs. cognitive) between subjects design. After the temperature manipulation, participants
were given explicit instructions to describe either their feelings (affective condition) or
evaluative thoughts (cognitive condition) in assessing a series of scenarios (as in Study 1), and I
examined the degree to which individuals felt a difference in physical temperature as a result. I
expected that emotional processing (as compared to cognitive processing) would result in
warmer (vs. cooler) perceived temperature. Thus, when comparing all four conditions resulting
from the 2 x 2 design, I expected that those in the cold-cognitive condition would be the coldest,
those in the warm-affective would be the warmest, and those in the cold-affective and warmcognitive conditions would be somewhere in between (but I made no predictions of which of
these two conditions would be warmer, since I make no predictions about the comparative
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warming/cooling power of the temperature vs. instructions manipulations). Importantly, to
support my thermoregulatory process explanation, I expected that in the cold temperature
conditions, those in the affective condition would be more comfortable in terms of temperature
that those in the cognitive condition, but that in the warm temperature condition, the reverse
would be true.

Method
One hundred and seventeen undergraduate students were assigned to one of two
temperature conditions. Temperature was manipulated by asking participants to hold onto a cup
throughout the duration of the experiment. As a cover story, respondents were told that the
experimenters were interested in their ability to multi-task. Depending on condition, the cup was
filled with either cold water or warm water before participants entered the lab (manipulation used
in Williams and Bargh 2008). Cold water was obtained from an ice-filled cooler, while the warm
water was poured from an electric kettle (cup surface temperature ranged from approximately
45–60°F in the cold condition, and 110–125°F in the warm condition). After the temperature
manipulation, I measured mood and arousal. Mood was measured using five 7-point Likert scale
items (Good Mood, Content, Cheerful, Unhappy (reverse coded), Bored (reverse coded); α =
.80), and perceived arousal was measured using a 24-item scale (ex. “alert,” “excited,” “drowsy,”
taken from Anderson, Deuser and DeNeve 1995, α = .92).
Next, participants were given explicit task instructions to describe either their feelings or
evaluative thoughts in assessing a series of scenarios (as in Study 1). In this experiment, I was
interested in whether the affective versus cognitive pathway instructions would lead to
differences in perceived physical temperature. Thus, afterwards, I asked participants to indicate
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their perceived temperature (“Please indicate how warm or cold you currently feel in terms of
temperature” on a 9-point Likert scale anchored by “extremely cold” and “extremely warm.”
However, to support my thermoregulation process, I was most interested in how well each
process allowed individuals to “mentally thermoregulate.” Thus, participants were asked to
indicate their comfort temperature-wise (“Please indicate how comfortable you currently feel, in
terms of temperature”) on a 9-point Likert scale anchored by “very uncomfortable” and “very
comfortable.” Afterwards, participants indicated gender and age.

Results and Discussion
Covariates and Control Measures. Neither gender nor age significantly interacted with
the independent variable (affective vs. cognitive instructions) nor covaried significantly with the
dependent measures in the study (perceived temperature and thermal comfort), and were thus
excluded from the remaining analysis. In addition, the temperature manipulation did not have a
significant impact on perceived arousal (F(1, 115) = 1.13, p > .1) or mood (F(1, 115) < 1), and
were thus excluded from the remaining analysis as well.
Perceived Temperature. According to my proposed framework, I expected that emotional
processing (as compared to cognitive processing) would result in warmer (vs. cooler) perceived
temperatures regardless of whether participants were exposed to the warm or cold temperature
manipulation (a main effect). As predicted, the results did indeed demonstrate a significant main
effect of processing instructions on respondents’ perceived temperature (MAffective = 5.98 vs.
MCognitive = 5.13, F(1, 113) = 9.34, p < .01). Thus, respondents’ self-reported temperature in the
affective conditions was significantly higher than in the cognitive condition. Temperature and
instruction manipulations did not have an interactive effect on perceived temperature (p > .6),
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nor did I expect them to. However, as I predicted, a planned linear contrast confirmed that
perceived temperatures from the four conditions resulting from our temperature x instructions
design followed a linear pattern (the order hypothesized was, in order of cold to warm: matched:
cold-cognitive; mixed: warm-cognitive/cold-affective; and matched: warm-affective (F(1, 113) =
4.49, p < .05). Additional analyses of planned contrasts indicated that the perceived temperature
for those participants in the cold-affective condition was significantly warmer than for those in
the cold-cognitive condition (MCold-Affective = 5.93 vs. MCold-Cognitive = 4.97, F(1, 113) = 6.30, p <
.05), and those in the warm-affective condition displayed marginally significantly warmer
perceived temperature than those in the warm-cognitive condition (MWarm-Affective = 6.04 vs.
MWarm-Cognitive = 5.33, F(1, 113) = 3.00, p < .09), see figure 3 for a visual representation of the
contrasts). These results demonstrate a perceived warming (vs. cooling) impact of employing an
affective (vs. cognitive) pathway, regardless of the initial physical temperature manipulation.
Hence, this study supports the thermoregulation explanation by suggesting that the mere use of
cognitive versus affective pathways can indeed alter an individual’s perception of physical
temperature.
Figure 3
Mean Perceived Temperature by Condition- Study 2
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Thermal Comfort. Because my theorizing suggests that both cognitive and affective
pathways can function as regulatory mechanisms, I expected an interactive effect on thermal
comfort, depending on the initially experienced temperature. Indeed, an ANOVA revealed a
significant temperature x instructions interaction on respondent’s thermal comfort (F(1, 113) =
7.47; p < .01). In the cold condition, affective respondents were more comfortable in terms of
temperature than cognitive respondents (MAffective = 6.55 vs. MCognitive = 5.61, F(1, 113) = 4.43, p
< .05), but the reverse was true in the warm condition (MAffective = 5.79 vs. MCognitive = 6.63, F(1,
113) = 3.14, p < .08, see figure 4 for a visual representation of the interaction and contrasts). In
other words, participants whose instructions had a thermoregulatory tone that contrasted with
their initial experienced physical temperature (cold-affective and warm-cognitive respondents)
were the most comfortable, suggesting that they were better able to thermoregulate compared to
individuals whose instructions matched their initial physical temperature manipulation (coldcognitive and warm-affective respondents).

Figure 4
Mean thermal comfort by Condition- Study 2
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Study 3: Clocks
While my first two studies support the thermoregulatory power of affective and cognitive
decision-making, the purpose of study 3 was to examine whether individuals spontaneously
apply this regulatory strategy when exposed to temperatures above or below homeostatic levels.
In other words, this study sought to examine the impact of physical temperature exposure on
individuals’ reliance on affect in decision-making, and thus support the front-end of my proposed
mental thermoregulation framework (Appendix A). Specifically, I examined the degree to which
individuals were relying on affect by measuring the maximum amount they would be willing to
pay for insurance for an object (an antique clock; adapted from Hsee and Kunreuther 2000).
Depending on condition, the clock had either a high sentiment description (indicating high
affective value) or a low sentiment description (indicating low affective value). If one is not
relying on affect (which I propose should be the case in the warm temperature condition), then
there should be no difference between the maximum amount an individual is willing to pay
under the two object description conditions. However, if an individual is in fact relying on his or
her emotions (which I propose should be the case in the cold temperature condition), then we
would expect participants to be willing to pay more to insure the object with a high sentiment
description than for the object with a low sentiment description.

Method
One hundred and twelve undergraduate students were randomly assigned to one of four
conditions according to the 2 (temperature: cold vs. warm) x 2 (object description: low sentiment
vs. high sentiment) design. Temperature was manipulated using the same cup-holding procedure
as in Study 2. After the temperature manipulation, all participants were presented with a
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hypothetical scenario in which they would have the opportunity to purchase insurance for an
antique clock (Hsee and Kunreuther 2000). Participants read a description of the clock which
differed depending on condition: the clock was described in either a low sentiment or high
sentiment fashion (see Appendix B). In the low sentiment condition the object description
implied no sentimental value to the subject, while in the high sentiment condition the object
description did imply sentimental value to the subject.
After reading the scenario and object description, respondents indicated the maximum
amount they would be willing to pay for insurance of the clock, which was the main dependent
variable of interest. After making the decision, participants were asked to indicate the basis of
their decision (again using the scale adapted from Shiv and Fedorikhin 1999). Lastly,
participants indicated their gender and ethnicity.

Results and Discussion
Covariates and Control Measures. Neither gender nor ethnicity significantly interacted
with the independent variable (temperature) nor covaried significantly with the dependent
measures in the study, and were thus excluded from the remaining analysis.
Willingness to Pay. As predicted, an ANOVA revealed a significant interaction between
temperature and object description on willingness to pay (F(1, 108) = 4.46, p < .05). This
indicates that the difference between the two object description conditions was significantly
different in the two temperature conditions. As expected, in the cold temperature condition, the
difference between the low sentiment and high sentiment conditions was significant (MLow Sent. =
$8.71, MHigh Sent. = $52.12; F(1, 108) = 17.04 p <.01), and in the hypothesized direction
(participants were willing to pay significantly more for the clock when it had a highly
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sentimental description). In the warm temperature condition however, as expected, the difference
between the two object description conditions was not significantly different (MLow Sent. = $19.71,
MHigh Sent. = $32.22; F(1, 108)= 1.52, p >.1). Furthermore, the contrast between the cold and
warm conditions was not significant in the low sentiment condition (MCold = $8.71, MWarm =
$19.71; F(1, 108) = 1.19 p > 1), but was marginally significant in the high sentiment condition
(MCold = $52.12, MWarm = $32.22; F(1, 108) = 3.52 p < .07). See figure 5 for a visual
representation of the interaction and planned contrasts.

Figure 5
Mean Willingness to Pay by Condition- Study 3

Decision Basis. Again, the four-item decision basis scale measured whether decisions
across different conditions were based on respondents' affective reactions or cognitions. To
determine the extent to which reliance on emotions mediated the effect of temperature on
willingness to pay, I applied a moderated mediation bootstrap procedure (Model 8 in the macro
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suggested by Hayes, 2012). I expected that the indirect effect of temperature on willingness to
pay through decision basis would be significant in the high sentiment condition (where there is
an opportunity for an affective response), but not significant in the low sentiment condition
(where there is little opportunity for an affective response). Upon specifying a confidence
interval of 95% with 5000 bootstrap resamples, the analysis confirmed a conditional indirect
effect: in the low sentiment description condition, the indirect effect of temperature on
willingness to pay through decision basis was not significant, with a confidence interval
including zero (-9.4192 to 4.9247), but in the high sentiment description condition, the indirect
effect of temperature on willingness to pay through decision basis was significant, with a
confidence interval excluding zero (-19.0283 to -1.3141). These results suggest that when there
is an opportunity for an affective response (ex. via a sentimental description), reliance on
emotions mediates the effect of temperature on willingness to pay.
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Study 4: Pandas
The purpose of this study was to expand the boundaries of the thermoregulation process
examined in Study 3. Particularly, I wished to demonstrate that the extent to which an individual
relies on his or her emotions in decision-making is influenced not only by actual physical
temperature, but can also be impacted by changes in perceived temperature. Specifically, I
investigated whether mere simulated temperature influences reliance on emotions in decisionmaking. Thus, I manipulated temperature (cold vs. warm) via mental simulation. I adapted a
procedure from Hsee and Rottenstreich (2004). Hsee and Rottenstreich argue that when
individuals rely on affect in making decisions, they become insensitive to scale differences (i.e.,
differences in magnitude). Thus, individuals relying on their emotions are willing to donate as
much money to save one panda as to save four pandas, but those using cognitive processing are
willing to donate more to save more pandas. The study took the form of a 2 (temperature
simulation: cold vs. warm) x 2 (scope: one vs. four) between subjects design, and examined the
degree to which individuals were relying on affect by measuring their likelihood of donating
toward an effort to save the endangered panda/pandas. For those individuals in the cold
temperature simulation (who we predicted would rely on affect), I expected to find no difference
between donation likelihood in the one panda vs. four panda conditions. However, in the warm
temperature simulation condition, one would expect participants to be more willing to donate in
efforts to save the four pandas than in efforts to save just one.

Method
For this study, responses were collected from ninety-eight participants via Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk system. Respondents were presented with temperature simulation instructions
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depending on condition. Simulated temperature was manipulated by asking participants to read,
imagine, and retype a scenario in which they were consuming either a cold or warm beverage.
Participants in the cold condition read the following:
“Imagine that you are sitting at a cafe, and you are given a glass of iced tea. Visualize
yourself accepting the glass. As you hold the glass, you can feel the coolness of the glass
against the palms of your hands. You continue holding the glass, until you have finished
your iced tea.”
Participants in the warm condition read the following:
“Imagine that you are sitting at a cafe, and you are given a mug of warm tea. Visualize
yourself accepting the mug. As you hold the mug, you can feel the warmth of the mug
against the palms of your hands. You continue holding the mug, until you have finished
your warm tea.”
As a manipulation check after the temperature simulation, respondents were asked to
indicate how warm or cold they felt on a 7-point scale anchored by “extremely cold” and
“extremely warm.”
Afterwards, respondents read a hypothetical scenario that described rescue efforts to save
either one or four endangered pandas. In the one-panda condition, participants read a scenario
about a rescue effort for one panda, and only one panda was pictured. In the four-panda
condition, participants read a scenario about a rescue effort for four pandas, and four pictures of
the panda were presented (see Appendix D). The main dependent variable of interest was
donation likelihood (“How likely would you be to donate money towards the rescue effort?”),
measured on a 7-point scale anchored by “very unlikely” and “very likely.” After indicating their
donation likelihood, participants were then asked to indicate the basis of their decision, again in
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an attempt to ascertain whether decisions across different conditions were based on respondents'
affective reactions or cognitions. These decision basis items were the same that were used in
study 1 (α = .90). In addition, participants completed a Likert-scaled item measuring their
general concern for endangered animals to be used as potential covariate. Lastly, participants
evaluated their current mood state (measured with four Likert-scaled items: “I am in a cheerful
mood right now;” “I am in a good mood right now;” “I am unhappy right now; and “I am bored
right now,” α = .80), and indicated their gender and age.

Results and Discussion
Manipulation Check. An ANOVA revealed that the temperature simulation did indeed
lead to differences in perceived temperature in the desired direction (Mcold = 3.67, Mwarm = 5.15,
F(1, 96) = 42.24, p < .01).
Covariates and Control Measures. An ANOVA revealed that temperature did not lead to
any differences in mood across the conditions. Neither gender nor age significantly interacted
with the independent variable (simulated temperature) nor covaried significantly with the
dependent measure in the study (donation likelihood), and were thus excluded from the
remaining analysis. However, general concern for endangered species did covary with the
dependent variable, and was thus included as a covariate in the remaining analysis (greater
general concern for endangered species led to greater donation likelihood; F(1, 97) = 64.76, p
<.001).
Donation Likelihood. As predicted, an ANOVA revealed a significant simulated
temperature by scope interaction (F(1, 93) = 5.08, p < .05). Specifically, in the warm temperature
simulation condition, I predicted that respondents would be using a cognitive process and thus be
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sensitive to scale. Results confirm that participants were more likely to donate more when there
were four pandas (MFour Pandas = 4.30) than when there was only one panda in the scenario (MOne
Panda =

3.44; F(1, 93) = 4.76, p < .05). In the cold temperature condition however, where I

predicted respondents would rely on emotion and thus be insensitive to scale, the difference
between the one-panda and four-pandas conditions was, as expected, not significant (MOne Panda =
4.33, MFour Pandas = 3.96; F (1, 93) < 1). Thus, individuals were scale insensitive only in the cold
temperature condition. Further, the contrast between the cold and warm conditions was, as
expected, significant in the one panda condition (MCold = 4.33, MWarm = 3.44; F(1, 93) = 5.20, p <
.05), but was not significant in the four pandas condition (MCold = 3.96, MWarm = 4.30; F(1, 93) <
1). See figure 6 for a visual representation of the interaction and planned contrasts.

Figure 6
Mean Donation Likelihood to Pay by Condition- Study 4
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Decision Basis. Again, the 4-item decision basis scale measured whether decisions across
different conditions were based on respondents' affective reactions or cognitions. To determine
the extent to which reliance on affect mediated the effect of temperature on willingness to pay, I
applied a mediated moderation bootstrap procedure (Model 8 in the macro suggested by Hayes,
2012). Upon specifying a confidence interval of 95% with 5000 bootstrap resamples, the analysis
confirmed an indirect effect: the indirect effect of temperature x scope on donation likelihood
through decision basis was significant, with a confidence interval excluding zero (0.0848 to
0.8407). These results suggest that reliance on affect mediates the effect of temperature by scope
on donation likelihood.

33

Study 5: Cake
The purpose of study 5 was to provide more robust evidence for my theorizing in a
different decision making context (i.e. one related to indulgence) and different dependent
variables (choice and product evaluation). Thus, this study once again investigated the role of
physical temperature on reliance on emotions in decision-making. The study examined the
degree to which individuals were relying on affect in two temperature conditions by subjecting
participants to a binary choice task, in which one alternative, chocolate cake, was superior on the
affective dimension but inferior on the cognitive dimension compared to the other alternative:
fruit salad (procedure borrowed from Shiv and Fedorikhin 1999). According to the literature, if
people are relying on affect, they will be more likely to choose the chocolate cake, but if they are
relying on their cognitions, they will be more likely to choose the fruit salad (Shiv and
Fedorikhin 1999).

Pretest

A pretest was conducted to ensure that there were no differences in the perceived
physical temperature of the two snack options. Fifty-nine undergraduate students from the same
population as the main study were administered the pretest. Participants were shown a picture of
either the chocolate cake or the fruit salad, and were asked, “How cold/warm would you expect
the cake (fruit salad) pictured above to be?” and were provided with a seven point scale anchored
by “extremely cold” (1) and “extremely warm” (7). An ANOVA did not detect any significant
difference in perceived temperature between the two snack options (Mcake = 3.67, Mfruit salad =
3.55; F(1, 58) < .1).
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Method
One hundred and eighteen undergraduate students from an undergraduate subject pool
were assigned to one of two temperature conditions: cold or warm. Temperature was
manipulated using the same cup-holding procedure as in Study 3.
After being assigned to a manipulation, all participants were presented with a
hypothetical binary choice task (see Appendix C for experimental stimuli), in which they had to
choose an afternoon snack to purchase. Between the two options, one alternative, chocolate cake,
was superior on the affective dimension but inferior on the cognitive dimension compared to the
other alternative, fruit salad (procedure borrowed from Shiv and Fedorikhin 1999). The main
dependent variable of interest in this study was the participant’s choice in the binary choice task
(either chocolate cake or fruit salad). As an additional dependent measure, participants were
asked to assess their likelihood of purchasing the chocolate cake if not forced to choose (“If you
were not forced to choose any one option, how likely would you be to purchase the chocolate
cake?”). To ascertain whether decisions were based on respondents' affective reactions or
cognitions, participants were then asked to indicate the basis of their choice on the same scale
used in Study 1a. In addition, participants completed 3 Likert-scaled items to be used as potential
covariates: health consciousness (“I consider myself a health conscious individual”), general
preference for chocolate cake (“I am a chocolate cake fanatic”) and general preference for fruit
salad (“I am a fruit salad fanatic”). Lastly, participants indicated their gender and ethnicity.
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Results and Discussion
Covariates and Control Measures. Checks were also made to ensure that none of the
covariates significantly interacted with the independent variable (temperature). Of the potential
covariates, only two (general preference for chocolate cake and general preference for fruit
salad) covaried significantly with both dependent measures in the study and were thus included
in the remaining analyses (greater general preference for cake led to increased purchase
likelihood of cake (F(1, 117) = 10.32, p <.001), and greater general preference for fruit salad led
to reduced purchase likelihood of cake (F(1, 117) = 2.00, p < .08).
Choice and Purchase Likelihood. As predicted, a binary logistic regression analysis
confirmed a significant main effect of temperature on choice (Χ2 = 8.46 p < .01). In the cold
temperature condition, 57% of participants chose the chocolate cake, while in the warm
temperature condition, only 30% of respondents made that choice. Thus, choice probabilities
differed in the hypothesized direction, suggesting that the affectively superior option dominated
in the cold condition, but the cognitively superior option dominated in the warm condition. In
addition, an ANOVA revealed significant main effect of temperature on purchase likelihood of
cake (“If you were not forced to choose any one option, how likely would you be to purchase the
chocolate cake”) (F(1, 117) = 4.62, p <.05). Again, results were in the hypothesized direction
(Mcold = 4.60, Mwarm = 3.75).
Decision Basis. As previously mentioned, the four-item decision basis scale (α = .84)
measured whether decisions across different conditions were based on respondents' affective
reactions or cognitions (higher values indicated more reliance on affect). An ANOVA revealed a
significant effect of temperature on reliance on affect in the hypothesized direction (Mcold = 4.02,
Mwarm = 3.27; F(1, 117) = 5.98, p < .05). To determine the extent to which reliance on affect
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mediated the effect of temperature on choice and purchase likelihood, I applied the bootstrap
procedure (Model 4 in the macro suggested by Hayes, 2012). Specifying a confidence interval of
95% with 5000 bootstrap resamples, the indirect effect of temperature on choice through
decision basis was significant, with a confidence interval excluding zero (-0.9781 to -0.0323). In
addition, the indirect effect of temperature on purchase likelihood through decision basis was
also significant, again with a confidence interval excluding zero (-0.5761 to -0.0483). Thus, these
results suggest that reliance on affect does indeed mediate the relationship of temperature on
choice and purchase likelihood of cake.
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General Discussion
Using a thermoregulatory framework in which organisms use various bodily organs to
adjust their temperature (Kirkes 1899; Romanovsky 2007), I explored whether a mere mental
process relying on emotions (cognitions) can function as a warming (cooling) mechanism, and
whether individuals might be induced to alter their decision-making style to fulfill
thermoregulatory objectives in response to experienced physical temperatures. I document the
ability of affective and cognitive pathways to function as warming and cooling mechanisms,
leading to both self-reported and objective increases and decreases in recorded temperature.
Further, I demonstrate that the adoption of a compensatory pathway can indeed aid in providing
temperature-related comfort. Lastly, but crucially, I document the effect of physical temperature
on choice, willingness to pay, and donation likelihood, and support the role of reliance on
emotions, a mental but ultimately brain-based pathway, as a mediator. Thus, taken as a set, these
five studies provide converging support for my proposed mental thermoregulation framework
(Appendix A).
This research makes several meaningful theoretical contributions. As previously
mentioned, the current research supports the proposition that reliance on emotions (cognitions)
can function as a warming (cooling) process, and individuals may accordingly (and perhaps
nonconsciously) alter their decision-making style to fulfill thermoregulatory objectives in
response to experienced physical temperatures. Specifically, I suggest that an individual may
choose to adopt a decision-making process that is semantically consistent with his or her
thermoregulatory objective (and thus inconsistent with his or her thermoregulatory state). As far
as the author is aware, no research has examined whether an individual’s decision-making
process can function to change perceived or actual temperature, nor whether an attempt to do so
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may be part of an individual’s regulatory strategy. Further, I additionally contribute by
documenting the ability of affective and cognitive pathways to function as warming and cooling
mechanisms, suggesting that autonomic physiological responses (ex. sweating, shivering) are not
the only way in which we programmatically regulate our temperature.
Hence, unlike most previous and emerging literature on embodiment (Williams and
Bargh 2008), this research provides an example and explanation of why individuals may respond
to physical sensations in a compensatory fashion. Instead of merely assimilating to the physical
temperature in a semantically consistent manner (i.e. relying on emotions more when warm),
physical sensations might instead activate a thermoregulatory goal, thus motivating individuals
to embody a process with a semantically-opposite thermoregulatory tone. Hence, this manuscript
paves the way for research to explore other instances in which physical sensations may lead to
goal-driven behavior in a pattern that is metaphorically inconsistent with an experienced physical
state. Such new research streams might explore how other atmospheric dimensions aside from
temperature can lead to changes in mental processes. Lighting, for example, is one such
dimension. Retailers such as Abercrombie and Fitch use dim illumination in their stores with the
objective of projecting a particular brand image. However, emerging research suggests the use of
dim illumination may have unintended consequences, creating a goal of increasing cognitive
illumination, operationalized as feelings of decision certainty (King 2013). Illumination and
temperature, then, appear to be two perceptual dimensions of atmospherics that may influence
higher order, executive processes that influence the relative use of mental processes. Beyond
illumination and temperature, it would be important to identify additional perceptual dimensions
that can have an influence on cognitive and affective processing.
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There has been a recent call for research that explores antecedents to affective processing,
or “affective engineering” (Cohen, Pham, and Andrade 2008; Pham 2012). This research
represents a step in this direction by proposing a precursor to increased use of affective
information in consumer decisions, and contributes to the literature on atmospherics by assessing
the role of temperature on consumer judgment. Further, by exploring the impact of physical
temperature via a thermoregulatory framework, I address the call to more critically examine
processes by which sensory cues exert their effects (Krishna 2012).
Finally, from a broader, more structural perspective, the results of the experiments are
also consistent with Damasio, Tranel, and Damasio’s (1991) Somatic Marker Hypothesis, which
posits that the organism’s brain and body generates some aspects of the anticipated stimulus to
help guide decision making, with temperature being one aspect that carries information for the
organism. The nature of information carried by temperature for the organism is a promising
avenue for further research.
Several practical implications stem from these research findings as well. Physical
temperature can be manipulated in retail environments via thermostat control, or providing
patrons with a warm or cool drink. A retailer selling hedonic goods would likely benefit a
consumer’s reliance on affect, and thus may profit by lowering the environmental temperature in
the retail space. Interestingly, a New York Times article titled, “Shivering of Luxury,” suggests
external validity to this finding by reporting a strong negative correlation between a retailer’s
prices and store temperature- the ritzier the establishment, the lower the thermostat setting
(Salkin 2005). The current research suggests that this may be an effective strategy for luxury
retailers, since low temperatures may induce patrons to adopt a more affective mind-set, in which
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they are more likely to legitimize hedonic and indulgent purchases. A restaurant hoping to entice
patrons with its indulgent dessert selections might similarly benefit from lowered temperatures.
This research also provides marketing applications for advertising and promotions. Aside
from temperature manipulation via store-based thermostat control, companies can impact
individuals’ experienced temperature via non-traditional promotional campaigns. For example,
Columbia Sportswear recently set up a mobile walk-in freezer in Manhattan’s Bryant Park,
where consumers were encouraged sing karaoke while testing the brand’s new heated apparel.
Kraft Foods, on the other hand, built and maintained heated bus shelters in an attempt to convey
the warmth consumers would feel from eating stuffing (Elliott 2008). While these promotional
campaigns are meant to highlight product benefits, companies should be cognizant of the
unintentional consequences on a consumer’s decision-making style. Further, because this
research also showed that such processing differences can stem from simulated temperature,
advertisers should also consider the impact of inducing temperature sensations via ad copy,
images, and color usage.
Future research in this area might test a few potential moderators of the thermoregulation
process. These might include a measure of self-monitoring and/or temperature tolerance, for
example. A less intuitive, conceptually interesting moderator could be individual propensities to
gain weight or become obese, if temperature regulation is ultimately underpinned by energy
regulation. If warm temperatures induce relatively more cognitive processing, exposure to
warmth may be an important intervention for people with obesity. Indeed, there is some
correlational evidence that lower temperatures lead to lower rates of obesity (Bo 2011). If such
measures do indeed moderate the process, they might help establish boundary conditions for the
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psychologically mediated thermoregulation process, and build a functional account for when and
why temperatures influence mental processes in organisms.
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Appendix A: Illustration of Proposed Model
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Appendix B: Instructions for Studies 1 and 2

Participants in the Affective Instructions condition read the following:
“For each of the following scenarios, please describe in detail the emotional experience
that comes to mind. In other words, we are interested in your feelings towards each
scenario. Would the scenario make you feel pleasant or “positive” (e.g., happy, joyful,
pleased, proud) or would it make you feel unpleasant or “negative” (e.g., sad, angry,
disgusted, scared)? Please focus on your emotions when responding.”

Participants in the Cognitive Instructions condition read the following:
“For each of the following scenarios, please describe in detail the advantages and
disadvantages of each experience. In other words are interested in your objective
evaluation of each scenario. By evaluation, we mean a judgment of the pros and cons of
scenario. Please focus on your objective judgments when responding.”
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Appendix C: Stimuli used in Study 3

All participants read the following:
“Suppose that you are about to move to a new city. Your company will pay for all the
moving expenses. Among the things you ask the moving company to ship is an antique
clock. There is some chance that the clock may get lost in shipment. The moving
company does not provide insurance, but you can purchase insurance from an
independent company yourself. Buying insurance will not affect the chance of loss, but if
you buy insurance and the clock is lost, you will receive $100 in compensation.”

In addition, those in the “low sentiment” condition read the following:
“The clock no longer works and cannot be repaired. It has literally no market value. It
does not have much sentimental value to you. It was a gift from a remote relative on your
5th birthday. You didn't like it very much then, and you still don't have any special
feeling for it now.”

Those in the “high sentiment” condition read the following:
“The clock no longer works and cannot be repaired. It has literally no market value.
However, it has a lot of sentimental value to you. It was a gift from your grandparents on
your 5th birthday. You grew up with it. You learned how to read time from it. You have
always loved it very much.”
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Appendix D: Stimuli Used in Study 4
Participants in the One-Panda condition read the following:

Participants in the Four-Pandas condition read the following:
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Appendix E: Stimuli Used in Study 5

47

References
Ackerman, Joshua M., Christopher C. Nocera, and John A. Bargh (2010), “Incidental Haptic
Sensations Influence Social Judgments and Decisions,” Science, 328 (5986, June), 1712–
15.
Alberts, Jeffrey R. and Peter C. Brunjes (1978), “Ontogeny of Thermal and Olfactory
Determinants of Huddling in the Rat,” Journal of Comparative and Physiological
Psychology, 92, 897-906.
Anderson, Craig A. (1989), "Temperature and aggression: Ubiquitous effects of heat on
occurrence of human violence," Psychological Bulletin, 106(1), 74-96.
Anderson, Craig A., William E. Deuser, and Kristina M. DeNeve (1995), "Hot temperatures,
hostile affect, hostile cognition, and arousal: Tests of a general model of affective
aggression," Personality And Social Psychology Bulletin, 21(5), 434-448.
Ax, Albert F. (1953), “The Physiological Differentiation Between Fear and Anger in Humans,”
Psychosomatic Medicine, 15, 433-42.
Barsalou, Lawrence W. (1999), “Perceptual Symbol Systems,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences,
22 (4).
Barsalou, Lawrence W. (2008), “Grounded cognition,” Annual Review of Psychology, 59, 617–
45.
Bauer, Daniel. J. and Patrick J. Curran (2005). Probing interactions in fixed and multilevel
regression: Inferential and graphical techniques. Multivariate Behavioral Research, 40,
373-400.
Belk, Russell W. (1975), “Situational Variables and Consumer Behavior,” Journal of Consumer
Research, 2 (December), 157-64.
Bell, Paul A. and Thomas C. Greene (1982), “Thermal Stress: Physiological, comfort,
performance, and social effects of hot and cold environments,” In G. W. Evans (Ed.),
Environmental Stress, (pp. 75-104). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bo, Simona, Giovannino Ciccone, Marilena Durazzo, L. Ghinamo, Paola Villois, S. Canil,
Roberto Gambino, Maurizio Cassader, Luigi Gentile and Paolo Cavallo-Perin (2011),
“Contributors to the obesity and hyperglycemia epidemics. A prospective study in a
population-based cohort,” International Journal of Obesity, 35(11), 1442-1449.
Cabanac, Michel (1971), “Physiological role of pleasure,” Science, 173: 1103-1107.
Cao, Melanie and Jason Wei (2005), “Stock market returns: A note on temperature anomaly,”
Journal of Banking & Finance, 29, 1559–1573.

48

Cheema, Amar and Vanessa M. Patrick (2012), “Influence of Warm Versus Cool Temperatures
on Consumer Choice: A Resource Depletion Account,” Journal of Marketing Research,
49(6), 984-995.
Cohen, Joel B., Michel T. Pham and Eduardo B. Andrade (2008), “The Nature and Role of
Affect in Consumer Behavior,” In C. P. Haugtvedt, P. Herr, & F. Kardes (Eds.),
Handbook of Consumer Psychology, (pp. 297-348). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Damasio, Antonio R., Daniel Tranel and Hanna C. Damasio (1991), “Somatic markers and the
guidance of behaviour: theory and preliminary testing,” In H.S. Levin, H.M. Eisenberg &
A.L. Benton (Eds.). Frontal lobe function and dysfunction, (pp. 217–229). New York:
Oxford University Press.
Elliott, Stuart (2008), “Hot Food, and Air, at Bus Stops,” The New York Times, 2 December.
Hancock, Peter A. and Joel S. Warm (1989), “A Dynamic Model of Stress and Sustained
Attention,” Human Factors, 31(5), 519-37.
Hasselberg, Michael J., James McMahon, and Kathy Parker (2013), “The validity, reliability,
and utility of the iButton® for measurement of body temperature circadian rhythms in
sleep/wake research,” Sleep Medicine, 14(1), 5-11.
Hayes, Andrew F. (2012), “An analytical primer and computational tool for observed variable
moderation, mediation, and conditional process modeling,” Manuscript submitted for
publication.
Hong, Jiewen and Yacheng Sun (2012), “Warm It Up With Love: The Effect of Physical
Coldness on Liking of Romance Movies,” Journal of Consumer Research, 39, 293–306.
Hsee, Christopher K. and Howard C. Kunreuther (2000), “The affection effect in insurance
decisions,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 20, 141–159.
Hsee, Christopher K. and Yuval Rottenstreich (2004), “Music, Pandas and Muggers: On the
Affective Psychology of Value,” Journal of Experimental Psychology, 133, 23-30.
Jänig, Wilfird (2008), Integrative Action of the Autonomic Nervous System: Neurobiology of
Homeostasis, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
Kang, Yoona, Lawrence E. Williams, Margaret S. Clark, Jeremy R. Gray and John A. Bargh
(2010), “Physical Temperature Effects on Trust Behavior: The Role of Insula,” Social
Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 1–9.
Khare, Adwait, and J. Jeffrey Inman (2006), "Habitual behavior in American Eating Patterns:
The role of meal occasions," Journal of Consumer Research, 32(4), 567-575.
King, Dan (2013), “Illumination and decision making,” Working paper.

49

King, Dan and Chris Janiszewski (2011), “Affect-gating,” Journal Of Consumer Research,
38(4), 697-711.
Kistler, Andreas, Charles Mariauzouls and Klaus von Berlepsch (1998), “Fingertip temperature
as an indicator for sympathetic responses,” International Journal of Psychophysiology,
29, 35-41.
Kirkes, William S. (1899), Handbook of Physiology, Philadelphia, PA: Blakiston.
Krishna, Aradhna (2012), "An integrative review of sensory marketing: Engaging the senses to
affect perception, judgment and behavior," Journal of Consumer Psychology, 22(3), 332351.
Lam, Son K., Michael Ahearne, Ryan Mullins, Babak Hayati, and Niels Schillewaert (2013),
“Exploring the dynamics of antecedents to consumer-brand identification with a new
brand,” Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 41(2) 234-252.
Marieb, Elaine N. and Katja Hoehn (2007), Human Anatomy & Physiology (Seventh ed.), San
Francisco, CA: Pearson Benjamin Cummings.
Marken Lichtenbelt, Wouter D. van, Hein A. M. Daanen, Loek Wouters, Rolf Fronczek, Roy J.
E. M. Raymann, Natascha M. W. Severens and Eus J. W. Van Someren (2006),
“Evaluation of wireless determination of skin temperature using iButtons,” Physiology &
Behavior, 88, 489 – 497.
Metcalfe, Janet and Walter Mischel (1999), “A hot/cool system analysis of delay of gratification:
Dynamics of willpower,” Psychological Review, 106, 3-19.
Panksepp, Jaak (1998), Affective Neuroscience: The Foundations of Human and Animal
Emotions, New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Parker, Philip and Nader Tavassoli (2000), “Homeostasis and Consumer Behavior Across
Cultures,” International Journal of Research in Marketing, 17, 33–53.
Pham, Michel T. (2007), “Emotion and rationality: A critical review and interpretation of
empirical evidence,” Review Of General Psychology, 11, no. 2: 155-178
Pham, Michel T. (2012), “Keynote address,” Advertising and Consumer Psychology Conference,
Singapore, Singapore.
Pham, Michel T., Joel B. Cohen, John W. Pracejus and G. David Hughes (2001), “Affect
monitoring and the primacy of feelings in judgment,” Journal of Consumer Research,
28(2), 167-188.

50

Poulton, E. C. (1976), “Arousing environmental stresses can improve performance, whatever
people say,” Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, 47, 1193-204.
Preacher, Kristopher J., Patrick J. Curran and Daniel J. Bauer (2006), Computational tools for
probing interaction effects in multiple linear regression, multilevel modeling, and latent
curve analysis, Journal of Educational and Behavioral Statistics, 31, 437-448.
Raudenbush, Stephen. W. and Anthony S. Bryk (2002), Hierarchical linear models:
Applications and data analysis methods, Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Romanovsky, Andrej (2007), “Thermoregulation: some concepts have changed. Functional
architecture of the thermoregulatory system,” American Journal of Physiology:
Regulatory, Integrative and Comarative Physiology, 292(1), R37-R46.
Rolls, Edmund T. (2005), Emotions Explained, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rubinstein, Eduardo H. and Daniel I. Sessler (1990), “Skin-surface temperature gradients
correlate with fingertip blood flow in humans,” Anesthesiology, 73(3), 541-545.
Salkin, Allen (2005), “Shivering For Luxury.” New York Times, 26 June.
Schubert, Thomas (2005), “Your Highness: Vertical positions as perceptual symbols of
power,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89, 1-21.
Shiv, Baba and Alexander Fedorikhin (1999), “Heart and mind in conflict: The interplay of
affects and cognition in consumer decision making,” Journal of Consumer Research,
26(3), 278-292.
Snijders, Tom (1996), “Analysis of longitudinal data using the hierarchical linear model,”
Quality & Quantity, 30, 405-426.
Szocs, Courtney and Dipayan Biswas (2013), “Red in the Eye, Blue in the Mouth: The Influence
of Visual cues on Temperature Perceptions,” European Association for Consumer
Research Conference, Barcelona, Spain (Working Paper).
Szymkow, Aleksandra, Jesse Chandler, Hans IJzerman, Michal Parzuchowski, and Bogdan
Wojciszke (2013), "Warmer hearts, warmer rooms: How positive communal traits
increase estimates of ambient temperature," Social Psychology, 44 (2), 167-176.
Tavassoli, Nader (2009), “Climate, Psychological Homeostasis and Individual Behaviors Across
Cultures,” In R. Wyer, C. Chiu, Y. & Hong N. (Eds.), Understanding culture: theory,
research, and application. (pp. 211-221). New York: Psychology Press.
Tong, Luqiong, Rui (Juliet) Zhu, Yuhuang Zheng, and Ping Zhao (2013), “Warmer or Cooler:
Exploring the Influence of Ambient Temperature on Cognitive Task Performance,”

51

European Association for Consumer Research Conference, Barcelona, Spain (Working
Paper).
Varela, Francisco J., Evan T. Thompson and Eleanor Rosch (1991), The embodied mind:
Cognitive science and human experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Verplanken, Bas, Godelieve Hofstee, and Heidi J. W. Janssen (1998), “Accessibility of affective
versus cognitive components of attitudes," European Journal Of Social Psychology,
28(1), 23-35.
Wang, Tingting and Rongrong Zhou (2012), “Physical Temperature Effects on Consumer
Purchase Behavior,” Society for Consumer Psychology, Las Vegas, NV, (Working
Paper).
Wilkowski, Benjamin M., Brian P. Meier, Michael D. Robinson, Margaret S. Carter and Roger
Feltman (2009), “Hot-headed is more than an expression: the embodied representation of
anger in terms of heat,” Emotion, 9 (7), 464–477.
Williams Lawrence E, and John A. Bargh (2008), “Experiencing physical warmth promotes
interpersonal warmth,” Science, 606 – 607.
Zajonc, R. B. (1980), “Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no inferences,” American
Psychologist, 35, (2), 151-175.
Zhang, Meng, and Xiuping Li. (2012), "From physical weight to psychological significance: The
contribution of semantic activations," Journal Of Consumer Research, 38(6), 1063-1075.
Zhang, Yan and Jane Risen (2010), “Staying Warm in The Winter: Seeking Psychological
Warmth to Reduce Physical Coldness,” in Advances in Consumer Research Volume 38.
Zhong, Chen-Bo and Geoffrey J. Leonardelli (2008), “Cold and lonely: Does social exclusion
literally feel cold?” Psychological Science, 19(9), 838-842.

52

